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[L. A. No. 26110. In Bunk. Feb. 3, 1961.] 
DORIS S. SEE, Petitioner, v. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 
LOS ANGELES COUNTY, Respondent; CHARTJES B. 
SEE, Real Party in J nterest. 
[1] Divorce-Temporary Alimony.-Under Civ. Code, §§ 137.2, 
137.3, authorizing temporary alimony and suit money "during 
the pendency of any action for divorce or separate mainte-
nance," temporary relief, such as temporary alimony, child 
support and suit money, may be granted in a proceeding to 
vacate parts of a final divorce decree incorporating a property 
settlement agreement, such proceeding being an attack on 
the divorce decree, and it is immaterinl that the decree is at-
tacked only with respect to its property provisions and that 
the attack is by an independent action rather than by motion 
in the divorce proceedings. 
PROCEEDING in mandamus to compel the Superior Court 
of Los Angeles County to hear motions for temporary alimony, 
child support and suit money. Writ granted. 
Wright, Wright, Goldwater & Mack, John H. Rice, George I. 
Devor and Justin Gray for Petitioner. 
Harold W. Kennedy, County Counsel, William E. Lamo-
reaux, Assistant County Counsel, and Donald K. Byrne, 
Deputy County Counsel, for Respondent. 
Crowley & Rhoden and Harold Rhoden for Real Party in 
Interest. 
TRAYNOR, J.-Doris S. See and Charles See were married 
in 1942 and divorced in 1960. On March 14, 1959, they 
executed an integrated property settlement agreement divid-
ing their property and providing for child support and 
monthly payments in lieu of alimony. The agreement was in-
corporated in the interlocutory decree. The final decree was 
entered on April 27, 1960. On Junc 27, 1960, Doris filed an 
amended complaint in an independent suit in equity to vacate 
the parts of the decree incorporating the agreement. She 
also sought temporary alimony, child support, and suit money. 
[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Divorce and Separation, § 171 et seq. 
Melt. Dig. Reference: [1] Divorce, §175. 
) 
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The trial eonrt denied the h'lllporal',\' relief on the ground that 
it had no pow('r to make the orders rNjlH'sted. Doris seeks a 
writ of mandate to the trial court to hear her motions 1'01' 
temporary illimollY, child support, and suit money. 
Charles invokes the rule that temporary alimony canllot \)(' 
granted unless there is evidence of an existing marriage (Rerves 
v. Reeves, 34 Ca1.2d 355, 361 [209 P.2d 937] ; Colbert v. Col-
bert, 28 Cal.2d 276, 279 l169 P .2d 633]) and the rule that 
alimony canllot be granted after a marriage has been dis-
solved in this state by a court that had jurisdiction over both 
spouses. (Long v. LOllg, 17 Cal.2.d 409, 410 [110 P.2d 3831 ; 
Tolle v. Superior Court, 10 Ca1.2cl 95, 97-98 [73 P.2d 607l; 
Hudson v. H1tdson, 52 Ca1.2d 735, 744 [344 P.2d 295].) lIe 
contends that these rules are controlling here, since Doris 
attacks only the property provisions of the decree and does 
not attack the final divorce. 
It is true in the present case that the marriage no longer 
exists. The cases requiring marriage as a prerequisite for 
alimony and those denying alimony after a final decree of 
divorce did not involve a dispute over the validity of the 
property provisions of a divorce decree. In Reeves v. Reeves. 
34 Cal.2d 355 [209 P.2d 937], and Colbert v. Colbert, 28 Cal. 
2d 276 [169 P.2d 633], the question was whether an action i 
in which alimony was requested for the first time is barred 
when there is no existing marriage. In LOllg v. Long, 17 Cal. 
2d 409 [110 P.2d 383], and Tolle v. Superior Court, 10 Ca1.2d 
95 [73 P.2d 607], the question was whether new actions for 
alimony can be maintained subsequent to undisputed decrees 
settling property and support rights. There is no merit in 
the contention that Hull v. Superior Court, 54 Cal.2d 139, 
145 [5 Cal.Rptr. 1, 352 P.2d 161], overruled these cases. In 
Hull we merely held that entry of the final decree could not be 
refused because the husband had not fulfilled his obligations 
under an integrated property settlement incorporated in the 
interlocutory decree. 
[1] Temporary alimony and suit money may be granted, 
however, "[ dl uring the pendency of any action for divorce 
or for separate maintenance" (Civ. Code, §§ 137.2 and 137.3), 
and the crucial question in this case is whether an action for 
divorce is pending within the meaning of those sections. The 
quoted language was taken from former Civil Code section 
137. "It was settled under section 137 that the phrase there-
in, 'when an action for divorce is pending',' embraced many 
diverse proceedings growing out of the divorce action and 
arising after entry of the final decree." (IJerner v. Superior 
) 
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Court,38 Ca1.2d 676, 683 [242 P.2d 321].) Temporary relief 
has been allowed under seetions 137,2 and 137.3 in numerous 
cases in whieh a former spouse has sought to have a decree 
interpreted, modified, or enforced even though the marriage 
has been dissolved. Thus, in Lerner v. Superior Cotlrt, 38 
Ca1.2d 676, 685·686 [242 P.2d 321], temporary relief was 
granted after divorce in a proceeding growing out of a motion 
for modification of the child custody provisions of the divorce 
decree, Temporary relief has been granted in a proceeding 
to modify the alimony provisions of a divorce decree (Lamborn 
v, LambOl'II, 190 Cal. 794, 795-796 [214 p, 862]); and has 
been granted where the court did 110t have jurisdiction to 
modify the decree, but was merely interpretin!! or enforcing it, 
(Kahn v, Kahn, 95 Cal.App.2d 722, 723 [214 P.2d 80],) It 
has also been granted w11(,1'e the wife sought a writ of man· 
date to hayc judgment entered for a defil'ieney in alimony 
payments (Parker Y. PaI'ker. 22 C'al.App,2d 139, 141·1-12 [70 
P.2d 10031) ; and where the relief sought was vacation of the 
entire divorce decree. (Grannis v. Superior Court, 143 CaL 
630,632.633 [77 P. 647J ; Fisher v. Superior Court, 110 Cal. 
App. 565, 566·567 [294 P. 445].) Since the present proceed-
ing is also an attack 011 the dh'orce decree, temporary relief 
may likewise be granted under sections 137.2 and 137.3, and 
it is immaterial that the decrce is attneked only with respect 
to its propert~r provisiolls. It is also immaterial that the at-
tack is by an independent action rather than by a motion in 
the divorce proceedings. (Foy v. Foy, 23 Cal.App.2d 543, 
546 [73 P.2d 618].) 
Let the peremptory writ of mandate issue. 
Gibson, C. J., Schauer, J., McComb, J., Peters, J., White, J., 
and Dooling, J., concurred. 
